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SUMMARY:Biased voter model: How persuasive a small group can be?
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20210703T084000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20210703T090000Z
DTSTAMP;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20240806T143215Z
UID:indico-contribution-213@indico.fis.agh.edu.pl
DESCRIPTION:Speakers: Christos Charalambous ()\nWe study the voter model d
ynamics in the presence of confidence and bias. We assume two types of vot
ers. Unbiased voters (UV) whose confidence is indifferent to the state of
the voter and biased voters (BV) whose confidence is biased towards a comm
on fixed preferred state. We study the problem analytically on the complet
e graph using mean field theory and on a random network topology using the
pair approximation\, where we assume that the network topology is indepen
dent of the type of voters. We verify our analytical results through numer
ical simulations. We find that for the case of a random initial setup\, an
d for sufficiently large number of voters N\, the time to consensus increa
ses proportionally to log(N)/γv\, with γ the fraction of biased voters a
nd v the bias of the voters. Finally\, we study this model on a biased-de
pendent topology. We examine two distinct\, global average-degree preservi
ng strategies to obtain such biased-dependent random topologies starting f
rom the biased-independent random topology case as the initial setup. We f
ind that increasing the average number of links among only biased voters (
BV-BV) at the expense of that of only unbiased voters (UV-UV)\, while keep
ing the average number of links among the two types (BV-UV) constant\, res
ulted in a significant decrease in the average time to consensus to the pr
eferred state in the group. Hence\, persuasiveness of the biased group dep
ends on how well its members are connected among each other\, compared to
how well the members of the unbiased group are connected among each other.
\n\nhttps://indico.fis.agh.edu.pl/event/69/contributions/213/
LOCATION:ONLINE
URL:https://indico.fis.agh.edu.pl/event/69/contributions/213/
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